

Church and State Relations: Japanese Colonial Period

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In 1910, when Japan annexed Korea, the Roman Catholic Church had over one hundred years of history of its work in Korea with 46 expatriate missionaries, 15 native priests, 41 Korean seminaries, together with 69 churches and 73,517 members.¹ The Protestant Churches had three decades of works among the Koreans already, with rapidly increasing influences of the Presbyterians and the Methodists, with a Presbyterian membership of 12,202 and 3,621 Methodist members.²

The initial church and state relationship seemed surprisingly friendly. One missionary praised the encroachment of the Japanese in such kind words:

Prior to the annexation the administrative system was chaotic. By stern enforcement the Japanese have introduced quiet and order, have commenced to exploit the natural resources of the country, set up a judiciary, developed the beginning of an educational system, improved communication, and cultivated hygiene.³

Such acceptance of Japanese rule by the missionaries was further reflected in a letter from Rev. Arthur J. Brown, Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, to a Japanese government official, Hanihara Masanao: "Japanese

administration is far better than Korea would otherwise have had and far better than Korea had under its own rule."⁴

Acceptance of the Japanese administration was not merely a friendly gesture on the part of the missionaries; it was also the official policy of the Presbyterian mission, the largest mission in Korea. Their mission board secretary Arthur Brown further wrote:

What is the attitude of the missionaries toward the Japanese? There are four possible attitudes: First, opposition; second, aloofness; third, cooperation; fourth, loyal recognition. . . the fourth, loyal recognition, is I believe, the sound position. It is in accord with the example of Christ, who loyally submitted himself and advised His apostles to submit themselves to a far worse government than the Japanese, and it is in line with the teaching of Paul in Romans xiii:...⁵

The missionaries advised Korean Christians not to be involved in opposition to the Japanese, and Korean Christians also officially adopted the position of "loyal recognition" toward the Japanese colonial state. Consequently, any Korean Christians who were involved in political movement against the Japanese were "kept from responsible positions in the Church."⁶

Yet, the Japanese government did not trust Christian churches. Sermons preached by missionaries or Korean pastors that were deemed suspicious were thus reported to the authorities. Suspicion of Korean Christians was especially strong in the winter of 1910-11 during the revival movement called "campaign for a million souls."

This great evangelistic effort by Protestant churches in Korea aimed to bring one million new Koreans into the Christian faith. Many revival meetings were held and fiery sermons were preached. These meetings, too, were carefully watched by Japanese government officials.

Inevitably such suspicion brought oppression and hostility toward the churches. The culmination of this was the fabrication of the so-called "Conspiracy Case." In October of 1911, the Japanese colonial government began to arrest Korea Christian leaders from the cities where Christian populations were significant in number. A missionary stationed in Sonchon reported:

Time after time arrests have been made, sometimes one or two and sometimes several at a time, until now there are fifty or more from our neighborhood. The parents and relatives of these men do not know why they were taken. The men themselves do not know why.⁷

Finally, the colonial government issued a statement accusing these Korean Christians of plotting to assassinate Governor-General Terauchi as he passed through Sonchon in late December of 1910. The government explained the conspiracy case in the following words:

In the course of the prosecution of a robber arrested in Sensen [Sonchon in Korean pronunciation], North Heian Province, in August, 1911, the fact that a gang of conspirators under the guidance of a certain ring-leader had been trying to assassinate Count Terauchi, Governor-General of Chosen, was discovered.⁸

Since the attempted assassination was to have taken place in

Sonchon, arrests of Christians in this town were so numerous that the Hugh O'Neill Jr. Industrial Academy, the largest Presbyterian mission school in the area, had to close.

Those accused were imprisoned without a public hearing until June 28, 1912, when finally 123 of them were indicted and brought to trial before the District Court of Seoul. All of the accused complained about being tortured at the police station. One of the accused declared, "I was told by one of the officials that one man had been killed as a result of torture, and I was threatened that if I did not stick to the statements I had made, I should meet the same fate."⁹ A veteran missionary who was in Korea during the trial later wrote in demonstration of the falsity of such confessions:

I was able to secure a copy of the so-called confession before the police of the elder in whom I was especially interested. To my surprise and consternation I found that he had apparently not only confessed to the police that he had conspired with others to kill the governor-general when he came to Pyongyang, but that several missionaries including myself had attended one of their meetings and had urged the Koreans to be brave and kill the governor-general without fail. However, the record showed that the elder in his subsequent examination before the procurator had indignantly denied having had any part in or even knowledge of the alleged conspiracy.¹⁰

On September 28, after three months, the trial came to an end, 105 men were found guilty. However, the court could not truly establish the guilt of those accused. Indeed, the case was full of holes from the start. On the dates which

the prosecution charged that Yun Chi Ho had met the other plotters in Seoul, he was in Kaesong City. Also, the confessions stated that toward the end of December 1910, conspirators travelled to Sonchon to kill General Terauchi. The investigation showed, however, that during the last six days of December the number of passengers arriving in Sonchon by two different railways did not exceed seventy. Finally, in a curious twist, the court did not try any missionaries. If they had been involved in the meetings, handing out revolvers and urging "the Koreans to be brave and kill the governor-general without fail," then they should have been charged as well. However, as missionaries were not called to account, neither were they allowed "to be called as witnesses for the defense."¹¹ For all these reasons, the entire trial was a complete fabrication.

The Korean Christians now convicted of "attempting to assassinate the governor-general" appealed to the Seoul Appeals Court and the court met fifty-one times between November 26, 1912, and February 25, 1913. The court reduced the ten years sentences to six years of penal servitude, and some were acquitted. However, the accused refused to accept the decision of the appeals court and went to the Higher Court of the Governor-General. That court chose to reconsider only the cases of those sentenced to penal servitude, and the rehearing began on July 1, 1913, in Taegu appeals court. It ended three days later, and the decision

was announced on July 15. The Court upheld the previous court's decision with minor changes in terms of sentences. Again the defendants brought the case before the Higher Court, but on October 9, 1913, the court ruled against any further hearing and upheld the judgment of the Taegu court.

There was no question that those prosecuting the "Conspiracy Case" had no case whatsoever. The government was unable to produce even the slightest evidence of the conspiracy on the part of Christians in Korea or abroad. This "conspiracy case" only escalated the tension between the church and state relations.

The church leaders in the United States concerned for the Christian cause in Korea interpreted the Conspiracy Case as evidence of Japan's political aim to suppress Christianity. Dr. Brown, the secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Mission, made a strong protest against the case and against Japanese government:

. . . we cannot be indifferent to the effect of the present policy of the Japanese police upon a mission work which now represents approximately 330 foreign missionaries, 962 schools, a medical college, a nurses' training school, thirteen hospitals, eighteen dispensaries, an orphanage, a school for the blind, a leper asylum, a printing press, 500 churches, a Christian community of 250,000, property worth approximately a million dollars, and an annual expenditure of over \$250,000. This extensive work is being injuriously affected by the reign of terror which now prevails among the Koreans.¹²

The Japanese government was surprised and disturbed to hear such reactions. On February 13, 1915, the colonial government released all of the accused before the completion

of their prison sentences. However, the government continued oppressive policies against the Christian churches in various ways.

In the area of medical works, of the missionaries, for example, the government was fully aware of the shortage of doctors and the great assistance rendered by medical missionaries. The need for doctors was so great that the government permitted some Japanese to practice medicine without official licenses and proper qualifications. Despite the obvious need, the government persisted in restricting the medical practice of Christian missionaries by making it unusually difficult for them to obtain licenses. On November 15, 1913, Ordinance No. 100 was issued by the government requiring all who desired to practice medicine to apply for permission from the governor-general. The ordinance listed as qualifications:

1. Those qualified according to the law in force in Japan
2. Those graduated from medical schools recognized by the Governor-General
3. Those who have passed a medical examination prescribed by the Governor-General
4. Those Japanese subjects graduated from medical schools of good standing in foreign countries
5. Those foreigners who have obtained a license in their respective countries, in which qualified Japanese subjects are permitted to practice medicine.¹³

Without considering the difficulties of obtaining licenses under the requirements laid down in items one through four,

item five alone limited foreign medical practice in Korea to those of British nationality. Only Great Britain permitted Japanese subjects who had received medical training and certification in Japan to practice medicine in Britain. The ordinance was modified in July 1914 to allow more foreign doctors to obtain general licenses, but restrictions against the Christian missionaries were not altogether eliminated.

In the area of Christian education there was also significant government pressure. General Ordinance No. 24, as contained in the "Revision of Regulations for Private Schools" issued in March 1915, excluded the Bible from all school curricula and required all teachers to learn the Japanese language within the next five years and teach only in that "national language."

On August 16 of the same year, in order to supervise the propagation of Christianity, Government Ordinance No. 83 stated that official permission had to be secured before opening a new church or employing any paid workers in a church. Such permission was very difficult to obtain. Some churches were never able to secure permission to build and eventually had to disperse as a result. Regulations such as these tightened the control on all Christian activities.

For Korean Christians, it was unquestionably clear that the Japanese state toward the Christian churches were oppressive, and that the "religious liberty" guaranteed by the constitution of Japan was not being honored in Korea.

Eventually, Korean Christians responded to such oppressive alien state policies with open protest and by aligning themselves with other religious groups opposed to Japanese rule. The first public exhibition of this solidarity was the nationwide "March First Independence Movement" of 1919, which was first and foremost a direct reaction by the Korean public against the Japanese colonial state.

Korean Christians were active participants in this independence movement of 1919. The sixteen of the thirty-three signers of the declaration were Christian leaders, among them Rev. Kil Son Ju, the first ordained Korean Presbyterian minister. Many Christian churches became gathering places for demonstrators to hear the declaration of independence read.

The government placed primary blame on the Christians for instigating the protests and retaliated against them. Christian worship services were even more closely supervised by police and many churches were ordered to close. Practically every Christian pastor in Seoul was arrested and jailed. Soldiers stopped people in the street in order to discover and punish more Christians.

The number of Christians arrested became so great that many Christian schools had to be closed. In some localities the police arrested all church officers. By the end of June 1919, the following numbers had been arrested:

Presbyterian. 1,461

Methodist	465
Roman Catholic	57
Other	207 ¹⁴

Less than four months later the number of Presbyterians in jail had increased to 3,804, among them 134 pastors and elders. In the course of this persecution, forty-one Presbyterian leaders were shot and six others were beaten to death. Twelve Presbyterian churches were destroyed, and the homes of many missionaries were searched by the police, resulting in more property damage. Some of the missionaries were physically attacked by soldiers and severely beaten. Under these conditions, the work of the church was disastrously affected. One missionary reported:

With the launching of the Independence Movement in March, 1919, the work suddenly stopped. Everything was changed. Schools had to be closed, Bible classes could not be held, Bible Institutes could not finish, trips to the country had to be cancelled, visiting in homes by missionaries was found to be inadvisable, many of our churches found their pastors, elders, helpers, and other church officers carried off to prison; missionaries lost their secretaries, language teachers, or literary assistants; every way we tried to turn regular work seemed impossible. . . .¹⁵

Of all the repressive measures taken against Christians, surely the most tragic was the massacre in the village of Cheamni, near Suwon city. Horace H. Underwood, the noted Presbyterian missionary, reported the incident in detail. On April 16, 1919, he and some friends left Seoul to visit Suwon. Nearing the town, they saw a large cloud of smoke. While visiting in nearby homes, Underwood had the

following exchange with a local farmer:

Underwood: "What is that smoke?"
Farmer: "That is a village that has burned."
Underwood: "When was it burned?"
Farmer: "Yesterday."
Underwood: "How was it burned?"
Farmer: (glancing around fearfully) "By the soldiers."
Underwood: "Why? Did the people riot or shout for independence?"
Farmer: "No, but that is a Christian village."¹⁶

Proceeding then to Cheamni the group learned that on the previous day, Japanese soldiers had arrived in the village and ordered all male Christians into the church. When they had gathered, about thirty in all, the soldiers fired on them with rifles and killed the survivors with swords and bayonets. Afterwards the soldiers set fire to the church and left.

Such violently oppressive measures were quickly criticized and deplored by church leaders in Korea and abroad. The Rev. Herbert Welch, bishop of the Methodist Episcopal church in Korea, visited Tokyo on his way to the United States meeting with Prime Minister Hara Takashi on May 15, 1919. The prime minister in his diary, now an important document, described the meeting:

I asked him to express his frank opinion on the Korean incidents. Then he said he is going to the United States to raise funds of two million dollars for the work of the church in Korea. But he feels quite uncertain about the future of the church in Korea in consideration of the severeness of the military rule, lawless actions of the gendarmeries and police, the oppression of Christians in various places, and discriminating

treatment of Koreans by the Japanese and discrimination in education.¹⁷

The prime minister's diary also recounts that on the next day, May 16, an entire committee of Christian missionaries from Korea visited Tokyo to report the oppressive situation there to Japanese officials.

The atrocities perpetrated on Korean Christians by Japanese soldiers and police were reported as well in the United States and in Europe despite efforts by the Japanese authorities to conceal the facts through their control of the communication systems. Upon learning of this persecution in Korea, the Commission of Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America sent a cable on June 26, 1919, to Premier Hara deploring Japanese actions and demanding administrative reform. The cable read:

Agitation regarding Chosen abuses increasingly serious, endangering good will. Cannot withhold facts. Urgently important you publish... that abuses have ceased and reasonable administrative reforms proceeding.¹⁸

On July 10 the Commission received a cablegram from the prime minister stating,

I desire to assure you that the report of abuses committed by agents of the Japanese Government in Korea has been engaging my most serious attention. I am fully prepared to look squarely at actual facts. As I have declared on various occasions, the regime of administration inaugurated in Korea at the time of the annexation, nearly ten years ago, calls on us for substantial modification to meet the altered conditions of things.¹⁹

The desire for "substantial modification" seemed to have been sincere on the part of Prime Minister Hara. Already in early April he had seriously discussed with his cabinet the possibilities of recalling Governor-General Hasegawa, providing equal opportunity for both Japanese and Koreans in education, abolishing the gendarmerie system, and generally treating Koreans without prejudice. To Hara's mind, it was clear that reform was needed if the Japanese administration was to continue, and he frequently brought up the Korean question in Tokyo cabinet meetings. On June 27, 1919, the cabinet discussed replacing Hasegawa Yoshimichi with Navy Admiral Saito Makoto as Governor-General of Chosen. In his diary the prime minister wrote:

I visited Admiral Saito Makoto and consulted about his willingness to assume the position of Governor-General and he consented. In the evening I invited Mizuno Rentaro and asked him to become the Administrative Superintendent (the next highest post) in Chosen, and I received his consent.²⁰

On August 4, 1919, the cabinet finally agreed to replace the governor-general and introduce political reforms. The Japanese emperor officially appointed Admiral Saito as the new governor-general on August 12. Saito Makoto was born in 1858. He had spent some time in the United States as a student and also as naval attaché to the Japanese embassy in Washington.

A week after Saito's appointment to the Korean position, on August 19, 1919, the "Imperial Rescript

Concerning the Reorganization of the Government-General of Chosen" was made public. Among other things it stated:

We are persuaded that the state of development at which the general situation has now arrived calls for certain reforms in the administrative organization of the Government-General of Korea, and we issue our imperial command that such reforms be put into operation.²¹

The reforms brought about a change in policy toward the Christian churches. Admiral Saito had conferred with missionary leaders after his arrival in Seoul. He asked them to frankly express their opinions on the Japanese administration and to make suggestions. In response, the Federal Council of Protestant Evangelical Mission in Korea prepared a statement and submitted it in September 1919. After expressing gratitude for the planned reforms, the document went on to say:

It was a keen disappointment to us, who had lived in Korea under the former government to find that what we had expected from the Japanese administration after annexation, was not forthcoming, but that military rule to which the country was subjected, restricted the religious liberty and educational freedom which had been enjoyed, introduced unjust discrimination against the Koreans, and eventually imposed upon the people such subjection and such harsh measures of oppression, as to call forth from them to the protest of the independence agitation of this year. The unarmed demonstrations at that time were met with such brutality. . . and we were forced for the sake of humanity to give expression to our protests.²²

The missionaries also said, "We urge that religious liberty, which is already guaranteed by the constitution of

the Empire of Japan, ... be made effective," and then made the following important requests:

1. That fewer restrictions be placed upon the church and upon missionaries
2. That discrimination against Christians and against Christianity by officials not be allowed
3. That missionaries be allowed to include the teaching of the Bible and religious exercises in the curricula of church schools
4. That restrictions on the use of the Korean language be removed.
5. That we be accorded more liberty in the management of our schools and freedom from unnecessary official interference
6. That teachers and pupils be allowed liberty of conscience
7. That the details of the management of our hospitals be left to the staff without interference from officials
8. That the censorship of Christian books be abolished²³

Subsequent meetings between government officials and missionaries were frequent.

The new administration established a Section of Religious Affairs in the Department of Education to foster both the expression of public opinion and the convenience of religious propagators. Three Japanese Christians were appointed to its staff. The government also decided to recognize the property of financial foundations used for religious purposes as "juridical persons," a decision which provided a more convenient method for the management of mission properties.

Significant changes were also made in regard to Christian education. The former administration had fixed a

definite curriculum for all grades of Christian private schools that precluded additional courses on the Bible or religion. However, in March 1920, new regulations for private schools were issued. The only required subjects were on "morals" and the Japanese language. Religion was again allowed to be taught in Christian schools. Further modifications of the law in 1922 and 1923 permitted the Korean language to be taught and spoken in the schools.

Policies governing Christian work in general were also changed. Before reform, specific permission from the governor-general was a prerequisite for the opening of a new church or other religious institution. If this was violated, a severe fine was levied. In April 1920, new regulations came out abolishing the fines and requiring only that new church openings be reported to the government. The government still reserved the right to close buildings if the institutions were found to have been used as "places for concocting plots injurious to the public peace and order."²⁴

Church workers and government officials began to maintain close, friendly contacts, and Japanese officials often praised the Christian church's contribution to the betterment of Korean life. The following statement by Dr. Mizuno at the Tenth Annual Conference of the Federal Council of Protestant Evangelical Missions in Korea on September 21, 1921, expressed this new attitude:

. . . I have made several trips into the country, and the more familiar I become with the conditions

in the peninsula, the more do I realize how painstakingly you labor for the uplift of the people. . . It can be said without any appearance of flattery that Chosen owes much of her advancement in civilization to your labors. . . So we hold Christianity in high regard to give it every possible facility for its propagation.²⁵

The churches' membership had declined in 1919 (the year of the independence movement), but had begun to increase under the new administration as the following statistics show:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Christians</u>
1918	319,129
1919	296,487
1920	323,575
1921	355,114
1922	372,920 ²⁶

Taking advantage of new opportunities, Christians held many evangelistic campaigns and revival meetings.

Despite all these good signs, it would be overstating the case to conclude that Christians under the Saito administration enjoyed full religious liberty with no restrictions placed on Christian work. The Japanese maintained a distrust of Korean Christians, and spying on Christian church activities continued. One missionary wrote:

They (the policemen) often insist on attending the services of the churches and schools and in regulating what is said and done. They frequent the halls of the schools and arrest the students on all sorts of suspicion. They censor all publications and often object to articles in the weekly church's paper. . .²⁷

However, the greatest problem that Christians faced

during this period arose from the worldwide economic depression. Some eighty percent of the Korean population depended on the land for their livelihood, but because of Japanese expansion onto the Korean farms, many farmers who had tilled their lands for generations lost their property. A missionary recounted:

There are now immense Japanese holdings that once belonged to Koreans and hundreds of Japanese small farmers are taking the land and the place of a like or greater number of Koreans; for the man from Japan can farm more than a Korean can and always manage to get hold of the land.²⁸

Korean Christian farmers were especially vulnerable to this change of ownership. Japanese landowners who were antagonistic to Christians would often take away the land rights from their Christian tenants and give them to other Japanese or to non-Christian Korean farmers.

After Admiral Saito Makoto's second term ended in 1931, General Ugaki Kazunari was appointed Korea's new governor-general.

The Ugaki administration seemed to maintain the policies of the Saito administration, and so the "rule of culture" did not yet disappear. The prevailing attitudes even resulted in awards being presented in recognition of the positive contributions made by missionaries in Korea. Dr. O. R. Avison, a medical missionary and educator, received the fourth degree of the Order of the Sacred Treasure from the Emperor of Japan, and early in 1937 the

Imperial Educational Association presented Dr. Samuel Moffett with a gold medal.

In Tokyo, however, the militarists were expanding their influence and engaging in terrorist activities to suppress liberal democratic elements in Japanese politics. They attacked Western ideas of democracy and demanded chauvinistic devotion to the emperor from the people. With the establishment of Manchukuo, Korea gained new significance regarding the communication, economy, and defense of the Japanese empire. The devotion of the Korean people to the empire became, from the Japanese viewpoint, more important than ever before, and as a means of making Koreans more loyal subjects, the Japanese administration began urging all Koreans including Christians to participate in Shinto ceremonies, for which an increasing number of shrines were built throughout the country.²⁹

To Christians, Shinto religion became a serious issue after 1935, when the government ordered all educational institutions, including private Christian schools, to pay obeisance by attending the shrine ceremonies. In previous years when the government had asked Christian schools to participate, Christians had been able to excuse themselves by participating in some other forms of constructive activities.

On November 14, 1935, the governor of South Pyongan Province called a conference of educators. Before the

meeting he wanted all of them to visit Shinto shrines. Dr. George McCune, president of Union Christian College in Pyongyang, and Velma L. Snook, principal of Sungui Girls' High School, refused to do so. The governor ordered them to leave the meeting and gave them sixty days to reconsider their action. If the missionaries' attitude did not change in that time, he warned, their educational qualifications would be revoked. The missionaries held their ground even after sixty days, and in retaliation the government did indeed revoke their educational permits. Police guarded Dr. McCune's house, and followed him wherever he went. On January 20, 1936, McCune was relieved of his college presidency and Snook was relieved of her principalship. Yet all the while, in trying to bring Koreans to the Shinto ceremonies, the government tried to persuade them that the rites had nothing to do with religion, but were instead patriotic acts:

The veneration of her illustrious dead in places specially dedicated to their memory has been a national custom of Japan for ages past, and the state ceremonies for this purpose are treated by the Government as distinct from those of a purely religious nature.³⁰

On January 29, 1936, seven Christian leaders, including Yun Chi Ho and Ryang Chu Sam, General Superintendent of the Korea Methodist Church, visited the Department of Education of the Japanese colonial government to address this issue. Mr. Watanabe, the head of the department, emphasized that

attendance at the ceremonies was a civil, not a religious act, and that participation was simply a payment of the highest respect to one's ancestors.

Korean Christians who had abandoned their own ancient practice of ancestor worship as idolatry were not easily convinced that paying such respect to Japanese ancestral spirits was not worship. In spite of the efforts to persuade them, most Korean Christians rejected the government's definition and refused to participate in the ceremonies. Many believed that bowing to the shrines violated God's commandment against idolatry, and the overwhelming majority of expatriate missionaries also understood the shrine ceremonies as religious acts.

Roman Catholics especially, though they came to accept the government definition after 1936, took Shinto rites to be highly religious in nature. A Japanese bishop told his people in 1931:

The Shinto Shrines, so the high authorities of the government tell us, do not maintain a religion, but as a matter of fact the ceremonies that are performed therein have a full religious character. Thus the sacred right of religious freedom, given to the people in Article 28 of the Constitution, is forgotten and violated by the ministry of education.³¹

Roman Catholics in Korea before 1936 understood that participation in the shrine ceremonies was idolatrous. This was changed by specific instructions from Rome. The story is told by Rev. Edward Adams, a veteran Presbyterian

missionary in Korea, that in a meeting of educators called by the government, Dr. McCune was challenged for his opposition towards participation in Shinto ceremonies. A Roman Catholic missionary who happened to be seated next to McCune whispered to him, "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church."³² On May 25, 1936, the Sacred Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith instructed Catholics in the Japanese Empire, including Korea at that time, to accept the government order. Item One of this instruction said:

The Ordinaries in the territories of the Japanese Empire shall teach their faithful that the ceremonies, conducted by the government at Jinja are civil affairs. According to the repeated, explicit declaration of the authorities and the common consensus of the educated, shrine ceremonies are mere expressions of patriotic love, that is filial reverence toward the royal family and the benefactors of their own nation; and that, consequently, these ceremonies have only civil value and that Catholics are permitted to participate in them and behave like the rest of the citizens.³³

The instructions resolved the shrine issue as far as the Roman Catholics were concerned. However, for Protestants, especially Presbyterians, the problem remained serious to the point that one mission report stated, "At present, possibly no problem of missionary policy is more difficult than that occasioned by the requirement of the Japanese government of attendance at the national Shinto shrines."³⁴ Protestants continued to reject the government's insistence on the nonreligious nature of shrine

ceremonies. A typical explanation for their opposition can be seen in a statement by the mission of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria (Australia):

We wish to express the high respect and loyalty which we hold toward His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan; this we do in gratitude for the blessings of good government. . . . But since we worship one God, alone, Creator and Ruler of the universe, revealed as the Father of Mankind, and because to comply with an order to make obeisance at shrines which are dedicated to other spirits, and at which acts of worship are commonly performed, would constitute for us a disobedience to His expressed commands, we therefore are unable ourselves to make such obeisance or to instruct our schools to do so.³⁵

The opposition of Presbyterian groups was so strong that the Executive Committee of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America soon felt compelled to recommend closure of the Korean mission schools:

Recognizing the increasing difficulties of maintaining our Mission schools and also of preserving in them the full purposes and ideals with which they were founded, we recommend that the Mission approve the policy of retiring from the field of secular education.³⁶

Some schools in Taegu and Seoul had difficulty closing at first because of Korean and missionary efforts to keep them open, but Pyongyang schools did not enroll any new students in 1937, and finally in March, 1938, all schools were closed, including the Union Christian College.

In August, 1936 a tough-minded militarist, General Minami Jirō, commanding officer of the Kwanto Army, became

the new governor-general of Korea. With militarists in control in Tokyo, General Minami was able to place Korea under a firm military dictatorship as well.

Meanwhile, government pressure on the Christian churches to participate in the Shinto ceremonies increased. It became more and more difficult to resist. In 1937, the Methodists, decided to comply with the government's request, agreeing with the government's claim that shrine attendance was a patriotic rather than a religious rite. In February 1938, the government called a conference of Christians intended to shape their thinking on the world situation at the time and to demand Christian support in the war efforts of the empire. The Presbyterians, at their general Assembly meeting of September 1938 in Pyongyang, finally agreed to obey the government order regarding shrine ceremonies.

However, it should be noted that the "surrender" of the Presbyterians was affected by an unusual use of government pressure. Before the meeting of the 400 delegates, each delegate was taken to a police station and simply told there by the police to approve shrine participation. Then, when the session began, high-ranking police officials sat right in front facing the delegates. No debates or negative votes were allowed, and anyone who tried to leave was brought back by police escort. With little other choice, the assembly resolved that participation in Shinto ceremonies was not a religious act and therefore did not conflict with the

teachings of Christianity. After the meeting the delegates did their obligatory obeisance at the shrine in Pyongyang.

The "official approval" of shrine attendance by the largest and most powerful Christian denomination in Korea proved an effective means of suppressing any further Christian resistance. The Shrine issue was solved as far as the government was concerned, but war policies of the government was to bring about more oppressive policies against Korean Christians.

In May 1939, the government called a meeting of Christian leaders in order to form an organic union of all Christian denominations under the Nihon Kirisuto Kyodan (the United Church of Christ in Japan), which would allow for more effective control of the Korean church bodies. The gathering of over seventeen hundred leaders, representing forty-seven Christian organizations, instituted an organization called the Chosen Kirusuto-Kyo Rengokai (the Federation of Korean Christian Churches).³⁷

Japanese pressures on Korean Christians to conform to Japanese war policies continued relentlessly. The government interference in church affairs increased, and any activities of which the government disapproved became excuses to imprison church leaders or expel missionaries. The "Day of Prayer Incident" in September 1941 was a typical example. Christian women throughout the world observed the World Day of Prayer during the last week of February.

Korean women had joined in this observance with their sisters around the world for many years. In preparation for the day, Reverend Herbert Blair, chairman of the Federal Council of Churches, asked Alice Butts of Pyongyang to make a short outline of the Day of Prayer program available to the churches. When the police examined the program, they discovered a prayer "for the Peace of the World" and charged that such a prayer was a sign of disloyalty to the war effort. Butts was imprisoned for one month, and many Christian leaders were brought to police stations for interrogation.

At this point, the Christian churches in Korea were completely controlled by the Japanese state. A paper prepared by missionaries on November 22, 1949, four years after the end of Japanese rule in Korea, documented that no church meeting could be held without police permission, nor without the presence of police representatives at every session. Restrictions imposed upon foreign missionaries were tight, including a restriction against their holding any administrative positions in the church. As Japan progressed toward war, the missionaries were compelled to withdraw from Korea. In October 1940, the United States' Consul-General, Gaylord Marsh, called representatives of the missions and informed them of the State Department's order to evacuate all Americans. Marsh urged an early evacuation and arranged to bring the S.S. Mariposa to the Inchon port

on November 16. On that day, 219 American citizens, practically all missionaries, were evacuated. Of the further withdrawal of missionaries up to March 31, 1941, the Japan Christian Year Book gave these figures:

Of the 108 reported in 1939 by the Methodist Mission, only 3 remain, and they will leave in April. Out of 66 Southern Presbyterians 5 remain. Of 14 Anglicans, 3 are here, all plan to leave this spring. The Northern Presbyterians, with 118 members in 1939, have 14 now.³⁸

With the main body of missionaries out of Korea, it seemed that the church simply became one more organization working for the Japanese cause. A statement adopted by the Executive of the Presbyterian Church at the General Assembly meeting in November 1940 proclaimed:

By following the guidance of the Government and adjusting to the national policy based on group organization, we will get rid of the wrong idea of depending on Europe and America, and do our best to readjust and purify Japanese Christianity. At the same time the church members, as loyal subjects of the Emperor, offering public service without selfishness, should go forward bravely to join in establishing the New Order in Asia.³⁹

This same outline added "Like other people, the church members should attend the shrine worship." On December 6, 1940, the Standing Committee of the Korean Presbyterian General Assembly called a meeting to form the Total National Force Union. The meeting was attended by some 220 delegates from each presbytery as well as by Vice-Governor-General Ohno and other officials of the Colonial government. The assembly passed a resolution that "Chosen Presbyterians are

resolved to give up the principle of reliance on Europe and America and reform our church as a purely Japanese Christianity.⁴⁰ The Methodists in Korea made a similar statement:

It is both urgent and proper that we Christians should bring to reality the true spirit of our national polity and the underlying principle of Naisen Ittai (Japan Proper and Korea form One body), perform adequately our duties as a people behind the gun, and conform to the new order, therefore we, the General Board of the Korean Methodist Church, hereby take the lead in deciding upon and putting into effect the following:

- I. Right Guidance of Thought
- II. Educational Reform
- III. Social Education
- IV. Support of the Army
- V. Unified Control of Organizations⁴¹

After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the Japanese imperial forces entered into direct confrontation with the United States. As the war progressed, the government attempted to force confessions of anti-Japanese activities in christian churches. The remaining missionaries in Korea, including sixty-seven Roman Catholics, were imprisoned. During the war, many churches were without pastors, and Christians were forced to work on Sundays. Institutions such as the Christian Literature Society and the British and Foreign Bible Society were closed.

On July 29, 1945, less than a month before the end of the war, all Protestant churches under Japanese control were ordered to abolish their denominational distinctions and combine into the Nihon Kirisuto-kyo Chosen Kyodan, the

Korean-Japanese Christian Church. During an organizational meeting for this purpose, a Shinto priest even led the Christian pastors to the Han River for a purification ceremony. Following this forced union about three thousand Christian leaders were arrested, and fifty of them suffered martyrdom. It was also reported that the Japanese army was planning to massacre a great many more Korean Christians in the middle of August 1945 because of the fear that these Christians might aid the Allied Forces in an invasion of Korea. Dr. Helen Kim wrote:

Some weeks after the atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we were told that over ten thousand leaders in Korean society who had been kept on the blacklist of the Japanese police were to have been arrested. In case of eventual Japanese defeat, the authorities thought these Koreans would become leaders and would retaliate against them. They had planned to massacre this group about the fifteenth of August, which proved to be the very day of the Japanese surrender.⁴²

On that memorable day of August 15, 1945, the turbulent relationships between Korean churches and Japanese state ended!

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<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Jinja</u>	<u>Number of Jinshi</u>
1923	40	77
1924	41	103
1925	42	108
1926	43	107
1927	43	129
1928	47	152
1929	49	177
1930	49	182
1931	51	186
1932	51	199
1933	51	215

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
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Church and State Relations: Japanese Colonial Period

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In 1910, when Japan annexed Korea, the Roman Catholic Church had over one hundred years of history of its work in Korea with 46 expatriate missionaries, 15 native priests, 41 Korean seminaries, together with 69 churches and 73,517 members.¹ The Protestant Churches had three decades of works among the Koreans already, with rapidly increasing influences of the Presbyterians and the Methodists, with a Presbyterian membership of 12,202 and 3,621 Methodist members.²

The initial church and state relationship seemed surprisingly friendly. One missionary praised the encroachment of the Japanese in such kind words:

Prior to the annexation the administrative system was chaotic. By stern enforcement the Japanese have introduced quiet and order, have commenced to exploit the natural resources of the country, set up a judiciary, developed the beginning of an educational system, improved communication, and cultivated hygiene.³

Such acceptance of Japanese rule by the missionaries was further reflected in a letter from Rev. Arthur J. Brown, Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, to a Japanese government official, Hanihara Masanao: "Japanese

administration is far better than Korea would otherwise have had and far better than Korea had under its own rule."⁴

Acceptance of the Japanese administration was not merely a friendly gesture on the part of the missionaries; it was also the official policy of the Presbyterian mission, the largest mission in Korea. Their mission board secretary Arthur Brown further wrote:

What is the attitude of the missionaries toward the Japanese? There are four possible attitudes: First, opposition; second, aloofness; third, cooperation; fourth, loyal recognition. . . the fourth, loyal recognition, is I believe, the sound position. It is in accord with the example of Christ, who loyally submitted himself and advised His apostles to submit themselves to a far worse government than the Japanese, and it is in line with the teaching of Paul in Romans xiii:...⁵

The missionaries advised Korean Christians not to be involved in opposition to the Japanese, and Korean Christians also officially adopted the position of "loyal recognition" toward the Japanese colonial state.

Consequently, any Korean Christians who were involved in political movement against the Japanese were "kept from responsible positions in the Church."⁶

Yet, the Japanese government did not trust Christian churches. Sermons preached by missionaries or Korean pastors that were deemed suspicious were thus reported to the authorities. Suspicion of Korean Christians was especially strong in the winter of 1910-11 during the revival movement called "campaign for a million souls."

This great evangelistic effort by Protestant churches in Korea aimed to bring one million new Koreans into the Christian faith. Many revival meetings were held and fiery sermons were preached. These meetings, too, were carefully watched by Japanese government officials.

Inevitably such suspicion brought oppression and hostility toward the churches. The culmination of this was the fabrication of the so-called "Conspiracy Case." In October of 1911, the Japanese colonial government began to arrest Korea Christian leaders from the cities where Christian populations were significant in number. A missionary stationed in Sonchon reported:

Time after time arrests have been made, sometimes one or two and sometimes several at a time, until now there are fifty or more from our neighborhood. The parents and relatives of these men do not know why they were taken. The men themselves do not know why.⁷

Finally, the colonial government issued a statement accusing these Korean Christians of plotting to assassinate Governor-General Terauchi as he passed through Sonchon in late December of 1910. The government explained the conspiracy case in the following words:

In the course of the prosecution of a robber arrested in Sensen [Sonchon in Korean pronunciation], North Heian Province, in August, 1911, the fact that a gang of conspirators under the guidance of a certain ring-leader had been trying to assassinate Count Terauchi, Governor-General of Chosen, was discovered.⁸

Since the attempted assassination was to have taken place in

Sonchon, arrests of Christians in this town were so numerous that the Hugh O'Neill Jr. Industrial Academy, the largest Presbyterian mission school in the area, had to close.

Those accused were imprisoned without a public hearing until June 28, 1912, when finally 123 of them were indicted and brought to trial before the District Court of Seoul. All of the accused complained about being tortured at the police station. One of the accused declared, "I was told by one of the officials that one man had been killed as a result of torture, and I was threatened that if I did not stick to the statements I had made, I should meet the same fate."⁹ A veteran missionary who was in Korea during the trial later wrote in demonstration of the falsity of such confessions:

I was able to secure a copy of the so-called confession before the police of the elder in whom I was especially interested. To my surprise and consternation I found that he had apparently not only confessed to the police that he had conspired with others to kill the governor-general when he came to Pyongyang, but that several missionaries including myself had attended one of their meetings and had urged the Koreans to be brave and kill the governor-general without fail. However, the record showed that the elder in his subsequent examination before the procurator had indignantly denied having had any part in or even knowledge of the alleged conspiracy.¹⁰

On September 28, after three months, the trial came to an end, 105 men were found guilty. However, the court could not truly establish the guilt of those accused. Indeed, the case was full of holes from the start. On the dates which

the prosecution charged that Yun Chi Ho had met the other plotters in Seoul, he was in Kaesong City. Also, the confessions stated that toward the end of December 1910, conspirators travelled to Sonchon to kill General Terauchi. The investigation showed, however, that during the last six days of December the number of passengers arriving in Sonchon by two different railways did not exceed seventy. Finally, in a curious twist, the court did not try any missionaries. If they had been involved in the meetings, handing out revolvers and urging "the Koreans to be brave and kill the governor-general without fail," then they should have been charged as well. However, as missionaries were not called to account, neither were they allowed "to be called as witnesses for the defense."¹¹ For all these reasons, the entire trial was a complete fabrication.

The Korean Christians now convicted of "attempting to assassinate the governor-general" appealed to the Seoul Appeals Court and the court met fifty-one times between November 26, 1912, and February 25, 1913. The court reduced the ten years sentences to six years of penal servitude, and some were acquitted. However, the accused refused to accept the decision of the appeals court and went to the Higher Court of the Governor-General. That court chose to reconsider only the cases of those sentenced to penal servitude, and the rehearing began on July 1, 1913, in Taegu appeals court. It ended three days later, and the decision

was announced on July 15. The Court upheld the previous court's decision with minor changes in terms of sentences. Again the defendants brought the case before the Higher Court, but on October 9, 1913, the court ruled against any further hearing and upheld the judgment of the Taegu court.

There was no question that those prosecuting the "Conspiracy Case" had no case whatsoever. The government was unable to produce even the slightest evidence of the conspiracy on the part of Christians in Korea or abroad. This "conspiracy case" only escalated the tension between the church and state relations.

The church leaders in the United States concerned for the Christian cause in Korea interpreted the Conspiracy Case as evidence of Japan's political aim to suppress Christianity. Dr. Brown, the secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Mission, made a strong protest against the case and against Japanese government:

. . . we cannot be indifferent to the effect of the present policy of the Japanese police upon a mission work which now represents approximately 330 foreign missionaries, 962 schools, a medical college, a nurses' training school, thirteen hospitals, eighteen dispensaries, an orphanage, a school for the blind, a leper asylum, a printing press, 500 churches, a Christian community of 250,000, property worth approximately a million dollars, and an annual expenditure of over \$250,000. This extensive work is being injuriously affected by the reign of terror which now prevails among the Koreans.¹²

The Japanese government was surprised and disturbed to hear such reactions. On February 13, 1915, the colonial government released all of the accused before the completion

of their prison sentences. However, the government continued oppressive policies against the Christian churches in various ways.

In the area of medical works of the missionaries, for example, the government was fully aware of the shortage of doctors and the great assistance rendered by medical missionaries. The need for doctors was so great that the government permitted some Japanese to practice medicine without official licenses and proper qualifications. Despite the obvious need, the government persisted in restricting the medical practice of Christian missionaries by making it unusually difficult for them to obtain licenses. On November 15, 1913, Ordinance No. 100 was issued by the government requiring all who desired to practice medicine to apply for permission from the governor-general. The ordinance listed as qualifications:

1. Those qualified according to the law in force in Japan
2. Those graduated from medical schools recognized by the Governor-General
3. Those who have passed a medical examination prescribed by the Governor-General
4. Those Japanese subjects graduated from medical schools of good standing in foreign countries
5. Those foreigners who have obtained a license in their respective countries, in which qualified Japanese subjects are permitted to practice medicine.¹³

Without considering the difficulties of obtaining licenses under the requirements laid down in items one through four,

item five alone limited foreign medical practice in Korea to those of British nationality. Only Great Britain permitted Japanese subjects who had received medical training and certification in Japan to practice medicine in Britain. The ordinance was modified in July 1914 to allow more foreign doctors to obtain general licenses, but restrictions against the Christian missionaries were not altogether eliminated.

In the area of Christian education there was also significant government pressure. General Ordinance No. 24, as contained in the "Revision of Regulations for Private Schools" issued in March 1915, excluded the Bible from all school curricula and required all teachers to learn the Japanese language within the next five years and teach only in that "national language."

On August 16 of the same year, in order to supervise the propagation of Christianity, Government Ordinance No. 83 stated that official permission had to be secured before opening a new church or employing any paid workers in a church. Such permission was very difficult to obtain. Some churches were never able to secure permission to build and eventually had to disperse as a result. Regulations such as these tightened the control on all Christian activities.

For Korean Christians, it was unquestionably clear that the Japanese state toward the Christian churches were oppressive, and that the "religious liberty" guaranteed by the constitution of Japan was not being honored in Korea.

Eventually, Korean Christians responded to such oppressive alien state policies with open protest and by aligning themselves with other religious groups opposed to Japanese rule. The first public exhibition of this solidarity was the nationwide "March First Independence Movement" of 1919, which was first and foremost a direct reaction by the Korean public against the Japanese colonial state.

Korean Christians were active participants in this independence movement of 1919. The sixteen of the thirty-three signers of the declaration were Christian leaders, among them Rev. Kil Son Ju, the first ordained Korean Presbyterian minister. Many Christian churches became gathering places for demonstrators to hear the declaration of independence read.

The government placed primary blame on the Christians for instigating the protests and retaliated against them. Christian worship services were even more closely supervised by police and many churches were ordered to close. Practically every Christian pastor in Seoul was arrested and jailed. Soldiers stopped people in the street in order to discover and punish more Christians.

The number of Christians arrested became so great that many Christian schools had to be closed. In some localities the police arrested all church officers. By the end of June 1919, the following numbers had been arrested:

Presbyterian. 1,461

Methodist	465
Roman Catholic	57
Other	207 ¹⁴

Less than four months later the number of Presbyterians in jail had increased to 3,804, among them 134 pastors and elders. In the course of this persecution, forty-one Presbyterian leaders were shot and six others were beaten to death. Twelve Presbyterian churches were destroyed, and the homes of many missionaries were searched by the police, resulting in more property damage. Some of the missionaries were physically attacked by soldiers and severely beaten. Under these conditions, the work of the church was disastrously affected. One missionary reported:

With the launching of the Independence Movement in March, 1919, the work suddenly stopped. Everything was changed. Schools had to be closed, Bible classes could not be held, Bible Institutes could not finish, trips to the country had to be cancelled, visiting in homes by missionaries was found to be inadvisable, many of our churches found their pastors, elders, helpers, and other church officers carried off to prison; missionaries lost their secretaries, language teachers, or literary assistants; every way we tried to turn regular work seemed impossible. . .¹⁵

Of all the repressive measures taken against Christians, surely the most tragic was the massacre in the village of Cheamni, near Suwon city. Horace H. Underwood, the noted Presbyterian missionary, reported the incident in detail. On April 16, 1919, he and some friends left Seoul to visit Suwon. Nearing the town, they saw a large cloud of smoke. While visiting in nearby homes, Underwood had the

following exchange with a local farmer:

Underwood: "What is that smoke?"
Farmer: "That is a village that has burned."
Underwood: "When was it burned?"
Farmer: "Yesterday."
Underwood: "How was it burned?"
Farmer: (glancing around fearfully) "By the soldiers."
Underwood: "Why? Did the people riot or shout for independence?"
Farmer: "No, but that is a Christian village."¹⁶

Proceeding then to Cheamni the group learned that on the previous day, Japanese soldiers had arrived in the village and ordered all male Christians into the church. When they had gathered, about thirty in all, the soldiers fired on them with rifles and killed the survivors with swords and bayonets. Afterwards the soldiers set fire to the church and left.

Such violently oppressive measures were quickly criticized and deplored by church leaders in Korea and abroad. The Rev. Herbert Welch, bishop of the Methodist Episcopal church in Korea, visited Tokyo on his way to the United States meeting with Prime Minister Hara Takashi on May 15, 1919. The prime minister in his diary, now an important document, described the meeting:

I asked him to express his frank opinion on the Korean incidents. Then he said he is going to the United States to raise funds of two million dollars for the work of the church in Korea. But he feels quite uncertain about the future of the church in Korea in consideration of the severeness of the military rule, lawless actions of the gendarmeries and police, the oppression of Christians in various places, and discriminating

treatment of Koreans by the Japanese and discrimination in education.¹⁷

The prime minister's diary also recounts that on the next day, May 16, an entire committee of Christian missionaries from Korea visited Tokyo to report the oppressive situation there to Japanese officials.

The atrocities perpetrated on Korean Christians by Japanese soldiers and police were reported as well in the United States and in Europe despite efforts by the Japanese authorities to conceal the facts through their control of the communication systems. Upon learning of this persecution in Korea, the Commission of Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America sent a cable on June 26, 1919, to Premier Hara deploring Japanese actions and demanding administrative reform. The cable read:

Agitation regarding Chosen abuses increasingly serious, endangering good will. Cannot withhold facts. Urgently important you publish... that abuses have ceased and reasonable administrative reforms proceeding.¹⁸

On July 10 the Commission received a cablegram from the prime minister stating,

I desire to assure you that the report of abuses committed by agents of the Japanese Government in Korea has been engaging my most serious attention. I am fully prepared to look squarely at actual facts. As I have declared on various occasions, the regime of administration inaugurated in Korea at the time of the annexation, nearly ten years ago, calls on us for substantial modification to meet the altered conditions of things.¹⁹

The desire for "substantial modification" seemed to have been sincere on the part of Prime Minister Hara. Already in early April he had seriously discussed with his cabinet the possibilities of recalling Governor-General Hasegawa, providing equal opportunity for both Japanese and Koreans in education, abolishing the gendarmerie system, and generally treating Koreans without prejudice. To Hara's mind, it was clear that reform was needed if the Japanese administration was to continue, and he frequently brought up the Korean question in Tokyo cabinet meetings. On June 27, 1919, the cabinet discussed replacing Hasegawa Yoshimichi with Navy Admiral Saito Makoto as Governor-General of Chosen. In his diary the prime minister wrote:

I visited Admiral Saito Makoto and consulted about his willingness to assume the position of Governor-General and he consented. In the evening I invited Mizuno Rentaro and asked him to become the Administrative Superintendent (the next highest post) in Chosen, and I received his consent.²⁰

On August 4, 1919, the cabinet finally agreed to replace the governor-general and introduce political reforms. The Japanese emperor officially appointed Admiral Saito as the new governor-general on August 12. Saito Makoto was born in 1858. He had spent some time in the United States as a student and also as naval attaché to the Japanese embassy in Washington.

A week after Saito's appointment to the Korean position, on August 19, 1919, the "Imperial Rescript

Concerning the Reorganization of the Government-General of Chosen" was made public. Among other things it stated:

We are persuaded that the state of development at which the general situation has now arrived calls for certain reforms in the administrative organization of the Government-General of Korea, and we issue our imperial command that such reforms be put into operation.²¹

The reforms brought about a change in policy toward the Christian churches. Admiral Saito had conferred with missionary leaders after his arrival in Seoul. He asked them to frankly express their opinions on the Japanese administration and to make suggestions. In response, the Federal Council of Protestant Evangelical Mission in Korea prepared a statement and submitted it in September 1919. After expressing gratitude for the planned reforms, the document went on to say:

It was a keen disappointment to us, who had lived in Korea under the former government to find that what we had expected from the Japanese administration after annexation, was not forthcoming, but that military rule to which the country was subjected, restricted the religious liberty and educational freedom which had been enjoyed, introduced unjust discrimination against the Koreans, and eventually imposed upon the people such subjection and such harsh measures of oppression, as to call forth from them to the protest of the independence agitation of this year. The unarmed demonstrations at that time were met with such brutality. . . and we were forced for the sake of humanity to give expression to our protests.²²

The missionaries also said, "We urge that religious liberty, which is already guaranteed by the constitution of

the Empire of Japan, ... be made effective," and then made the following important requests:

1. That fewer restrictions be placed upon the church and upon missionaries
2. That discrimination against Christians and against Christianity by officials not be allowed
3. That missionaries be allowed to include the teaching of the Bible and religious exercises in the curricula of church schools
4. That restrictions on the use of the Korean language be removed.
5. That we be accorded more liberty in the management of our schools and freedom from unnecessary official interference
6. That teachers and pupils be allowed liberty of conscience
7. That the details of the management of our hospitals be left to the staff without interference from officials
8. That the censorship of Christian books be abolished²³

Subsequent meetings between government officials and missionaries were frequent.

The new administration established a Section of Religious Affairs in the Department of Education to foster both the expression of public opinion and the convenience of religious propagators. Three Japanese Christians were appointed to its staff. The government also decided to recognize the property of financial foundations used for religious purposes as "juridical persons," a decision which provided a more convenient method for the management of mission properties.

Significant changes were also made in regard to Christian education. The former administration had fixed a

definite curriculum for all grades of Christian private schools that precluded additional courses on the Bible or religion. However, in March 1920, new regulations for private schools were issued. The only required subjects were on "morals" and the Japanese language. Religion was again allowed to be taught in Christian schools. Further modifications of the law in 1922 and 1923 permitted the Korean language to be taught and spoken in the schools.

Policies governing Christian work in general were also changed. Before reform, specific permission from the governor-general was a prerequisite for the opening of a new church or other religious institution. If this was violated, a severe fine was levied. In April 1920, new regulations came out abolishing the fines and requiring only that new church openings be reported to the government. The government still reserved the right to close buildings if the institutions were found to have been used as "places for concocting plots injurious to the public peace and order."²⁴

Church workers and government officials began to maintain close, friendly contacts, and Japanese officials often praised the Christian church's contribution to the betterment of Korean life. The following statement by Dr. Mizuno at the Tenth Annual Conference of the Federal Council of Protestant Evangelical Missions in Korea on September 21, 1921, expressed this new attitude:

. . . I have made several trips into the country, and the more familiar I become with the conditions

in the peninsula, the more do I realize how painstakingly you labor for the uplift of the people. . . It can be said without any appearance of flattery that Chosen owes much of her advancement in civilization to your labors. . . So we hold Christianity in high regard to give it every possible facility for its propagation.²⁵

The churches' membership had declined in 1919 (the year of the independence movement), but had begun to increase under the new administration as the following statistics show:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Christians</u>
1918	319,129
1919	296,487
1920	323,575
1921	355,114
1922	372,920 ²⁶

Taking advantage of new opportunities, Christians held many evangelistic campaigns and revival meetings.

Despite all these good signs, it would be overstating the case to conclude that Christians under the Saito administration enjoyed full religious liberty with no restrictions placed on Christian work. The Japanese maintained a distrust of Korean Christians, and spying on Christian church activities continued. One missionary wrote:

They (the policemen) often insist on attending the services of the churches and schools and in regulating what is said and done. They frequent the halls of the schools and arrest the students on all sorts of suspicion. They censor all publications and often object to articles in the weekly church's paper. . . .²⁷

However, the greatest problem that Christians faced

during this period arose from the worldwide economic depression. Some eighty percent of the Korean population depended on the land for their livelihood, but because of Japanese expansion onto the Korean farms, many farmers who had tilled their lands for generations lost their property. A missionary recounted:

There are now immense Japanese holdings that once belonged to Koreans and hundreds of Japanese small farmers are taking the land and the place of a like or greater number of Koreans; for the man from Japan can farm more than a Korean can and always manage to get hold of the land.²⁸

Korean Christian farmers were especially vulnerable to this change of ownership. Japanese landowners who were antagonistic to Christians would often take away the land rights from their Christian tenants and give them to other Japanese or to non-Christian Korean farmers.

After Admiral Saito Makoto's second term ended in 1931, General Ugaki Kazunari was appointed Korea's new governor-general.

The Ugaki administration seemed to maintain the policies of the Saito administration, and so the "rule of culture" did not yet disappear. The prevailing attitudes even resulted in awards being presented in recognition of the positive contributions made by missionaries in Korea. Dr. O. R. Avison, a medical missionary and educator, received the fourth degree of the Order of the Sacred Treasure from the Emperor of Japan, and early in 1937 the

Imperial Educational Association presented Dr. Samuel Moffett with a gold medal.

In Tokyo, however, the militarists were expanding their influence and engaging in terrorist activities to suppress liberal democratic elements in Japanese politics. They attacked Western ideas of democracy and demanded chauvinistic devotion to the emperor from the people. With the establishment of Manchukuo, Korea gained new significance regarding the communication, economy, and defense of the Japanese empire. The devotion of the Korean people to the empire became, from the Japanese viewpoint, more important than ever before, and as a means of making Koreans more loyal subjects, the Japanese administration began urging all Koreans including Christians to participate in Shinto ceremonies, for which an increasing number of shrines were built throughout the country.²⁹

To Christians, Shinto religion became a serious issue after 1935, when the government ordered all educational institutions, including private Christian schools, to pay obeisance by attending the shrine ceremonies. In previous years when the government had asked Christian schools to participate, Christians had been able to excuse themselves by participating in some other forms of constructive activities.

On November 14, 1935, the governor of South Pyongan Province called a conference of educators. Before the

meeting he wanted all of them to visit Shinto shrines. Dr. George McCune, president of Union Christian College in Pyongyang, and Velma L. Snook, principal of Sungui Girls' High School, refused to do so. The governor ordered them to leave the meeting and gave them sixty days to reconsider their action. If the missionaries' attitude did not change in that time, he warned, their educational qualifications would be revoked. The missionaries held their ground even after sixty days, and in retaliation the government did indeed revoke their educational permits. Police guarded Dr. McCune's house, and followed him wherever he went. On January 20, 1936, McCune was relieved of his college presidency and Snook was relieved of her principalship. Yet all the while, in trying to bring Koreans to the Shinto ceremonies, the government tried to persuade them that the rites had nothing to do with religion, but were instead patriotic acts:

The veneration of her illustrious dead in places specially dedicated to their memory has been a national custom of Japan for ages past, and the state ceremonies for this purpose are treated by the Government as distinct from those of a purely religious nature.³⁰

On January 29, 1936, seven Christian leaders, including Yun Chi Ho and Ryang Chu Sam, General Superintendent of the Korea Methodist Church, visited the Department of Education of the Japanese colonial government to address this issue. Mr. Watanabe, the head of the department, emphasized that

attendance at the ceremonies was a civil, not a religious act, and that participation was simply a payment of the highest respect to one's ancestors.

Korean Christians who had abandoned their own ancient practice of ancestor worship as idolatry were not easily convinced that paying such respect to Japanese ancestral spirits was not worship. In spite of the efforts to persuade them, most Korean Christians rejected the government's definition and refused to participate in the ceremonies. Many believed that bowing to the shrines violated God's commandment against idolatry, and the overwhelming majority of expatriate missionaries also understood the shrine ceremonies as religious acts.

Roman Catholics especially, though they came to accept the government definition after 1936, took Shinto rites to be highly religious in nature. A Japanese bishop told his people in 1931:

The Shinto Shrines, so the high authorities of the government tell us, do not maintain a religion, but as a matter of fact the ceremonies that are performed therein have a full religious character. Thus the sacred right of religious freedom, given to the people in Article 28 of the Constitution, is forgotten and violated by the ministry of education.³¹

Roman Catholics in Korea before 1936 understood that participation in the shrine ceremonies was idolatrous. This was changed by specific instructions from Rome. The story is told by Rev. Edward Adams, a veteran Presbyterian

missionary in Korea, that in a meeting of educators called by the government, Dr. McCune was challenged for his opposition towards participation in Shinto ceremonies. A Roman Catholic missionary who happened to be seated next to McCune whispered to him, "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church."³² On May 25, 1936, the Sacred Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith instructed Catholics in the Japanese Empire, including Korea at that time, to accept the government order. Item One of this instruction said:

The Ordinaries in the territories of the Japanese Empire shall teach their faithful that the ceremonies, conducted by the government at Jinja are civil affairs. According to the repeated, explicit declaration of the authorities and the common consensus of the educated, shrine ceremonies are mere expressions of patriotic love, that is filial reverence toward the royal family and the benefactors of their own nation; and that, consequently, these ceremonies have only civil value and that Catholics are permitted to participate in them and behave like the rest of the citizens.³³

The instructions resolved the shrine issue as far as the Roman Catholics were concerned. However, for Protestants, especially Presbyterians, the problem remained serious to the point that one mission report stated, "At present, possibly no problem of missionary policy is more difficult than that occasioned by the requirement of the Japanese government of attendance at the national Shinto shrines."³⁴ Protestants continued to reject the government's insistence on the nonreligious nature of shrine

ceremonies. A typical explanation for their opposition can be seen in a statement by the mission of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria (Australia):

We wish to express the high respect and loyalty which we hold toward His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan; this we do in gratitude for the blessings of good government. . . . But since we worship one God, alone, Creator and Ruler of the universe, revealed as the Father of Mankind, and because to comply with an order to make obeisance at shrines which are dedicated to other spirits, and at which acts of worship are commonly performed, would constitute for us a disobedience to His expressed commands, we therefore are unable ourselves to make such obeisance or to instruct our schools to do so.³⁵

The opposition of Presbyterian groups was so strong that the Executive Committee of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America soon felt compelled to recommend closure of the Korean mission schools:

Recognizing the increasing difficulties of maintaining our Mission schools and also of preserving in them the full purposes and ideals with which they were founded, we recommend that the Mission approve the policy of retiring from the field of secular education.³⁶

Some schools in Taegu and Seoul had difficulty closing at first because of Korean and missionary efforts to keep them open, but Pyongyang schools did not enroll any new students in 1937, and finally in March, 1938, all schools were closed, including the Union Christian College.

In August, 1936 a tough-minded militarist, General Minami Jirō, commanding officer of the Kwanto Army, became

the new governor-general of Korea. With militarists in control in Tokyo, General Minami was able to place Korea under a firm military dictatorship as well.

Meanwhile, government pressure on the Christian churches to participate in the Shinto ceremonies increased. It became more and more difficult to resist. In 1937, the Methodists, decided to comply with the government's request, agreeing with the government's claim that shrine attendance was a patriotic rather than a religious rite. In February 1938, the government called a conference of Christians intended to shape their thinking on the world situation at the time and to demand Christian support in the war efforts of the empire. The Presbyterians, at their general Assembly meeting of September 1938 in Pyongyang, finally agreed to obey the government order regarding shrine ceremonies.

However, it should be noted that the "surrender" of the Presbyterians was affected by an unusual use of government pressure. Before the meeting of the 400 delegates, each delegate was taken to a police station and simply told there by the police to approve shrine participation. Then, when the session began, high-ranking police officials sat right in front facing the delegates. No debates or negative votes were allowed, and anyone who tried to leave was brought back by police escort. With little other choice, the assembly resolved that participation in Shinto ceremonies was not a religious act and therefore did not conflict with the

teachings of Christianity. After the meeting the delegates did their obligatory obeisance at the shrine in Pyongyang.

The "official approval" of shrine attendance by the largest and most powerful Christian denomination in Korea proved an effective means of suppressing any further Christian resistance. The Shrine issue was solved as far as the government was concerned, but war policies of the government was to bring about more oppressive policies against Korean Christians.

In May 1939, the government called a meeting of Christian leaders in order to form an organic union of all Christian denominations under the Nihon Kirisuto Kyodan (the United Church of Christ in Japan), which would allow for more effective control of the Korean church bodies. The gathering of over seventeen hundred leaders, representing forty-seven Christian organizations, instituted an organization called the Chosen Kirusuto-Kyo Rengokai (the Federation of Korean Christian Churches).³⁷

Japanese pressures on Korean Christians to conform to Japanese war policies continued relentlessly. The government interference in church affairs increased, and any activities of which the government disapproved became excuses to imprison church leaders or expel missionaries. The "Day of Prayer Incident" in September 1941 was a typical example. Christian women throughout the world observed the World Day of Prayer during the last week of February.

Korean women had joined in this observance with their sisters around the world for many years. In preparation for the day, Reverend Herbert Blair, chairman of the Federal Council of Churches, asked Alice Butts of Pyongyang to make a short outline of the Day of Prayer program available to the churches. When the police examined the program, they discovered a prayer "for the Peace of the World" and charged that such a prayer was a sign of disloyalty to the war effort. Butts was imprisoned for one month, and many Christian leaders were brought to police stations for interrogation.

At this point, the Christian churches in Korea were completely controlled by the Japanese state. A paper prepared by missionaries on November 22, 1949, four years after the end of Japanese rule in Korea, documented that no church meeting could be held without police permission, nor without the presence of police representatives at every session. Restrictions imposed upon foreign missionaries were tight, including a restriction against their holding any administrative positions in the church. As Japan progressed toward war, the missionaries were compelled to withdraw from Korea. In October 1940, the United States' Consul-General, Gaylord Marsh, called representatives of the missions and informed them of the State Department's order to evacuate all Americans. Marsh urged an early evacuation and arranged to bring the S.S. Mariposa to the Inchon port

on November 16. On that day, 219 American citizens, practically all missionaries, were evacuated. Of the further withdrawal of missionaries up to March 31, 1941, the Japan Christian Year Book gave these figures:

Of the 108 reported in 1939 by the Methodist Mission, only 3 remain, and they will leave in April. Out of 66 Southern Presbyterians 5 remain. Of 14 Anglicans, 3 are here, all plan to leave this spring. The Northern Presbyterians, with 118 members in 1939, have 14 now.³⁸

With the main body of missionaries out of Korea, it seemed that the church simply became one more organization working for the Japanese cause. A statement adopted by the Executive of the Presbyterian Church at the General Assembly meeting in November 1940 proclaimed:

By following the guidance of the Government and adjusting to the national policy based on group organization, we will get rid of the wrong idea of depending on Europe and America, and do our best to readjust and purify Japanese Christianity. At the same time the church members, as loyal subjects of the Emperor, offering public service without selfishness, should go forward bravely to join in establishing the New Order in Asia.³⁹

This same outline added "Like other people, the church members should attend the shrine worship." On December 6, 1940, the Standing Committee of the Korean Presbyterian General Assembly called a meeting to form the Total National Force Union. The meeting was attended by some 220 delegates from each presbytery as well as by Vice-Governor-General Ohno and other officials of the Colonial government. The assembly passed a resolution that "Chosen Presbyterians are

resolved to give up the principle of reliance on Europe and America and reform our church as a purely Japanese Christianity.⁴⁰ The Methodists in Korea made a similar statement:

It is both urgent and proper that we Christians should bring to reality the true spirit of our national polity and the underlying principle of Naisen Ittai (Japan Proper and Korea form One body), perform adequately our duties as a people behind the gun, and conform to the new order, therefore we, the General Board of the Korean Methodist Church, hereby take the lead in deciding upon and putting into effect the following:

- I. Right Guidance of Thought
- II. Educational Reform
- III. Social Education
- IV. Support of the Army
- V. Unified Control of Organizations⁴¹

After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the Japanese imperial forces entered into direct confrontation with the United States. As the war progressed, the government attempted to force confessions of anti-Japanese activities in christian churches. The remaining missionaries in Korea, including sixty-seven Roman Catholics, were imprisoned. During the war, many churches were without pastors, and Christians were forced to work on Sundays. Institutions such as the Christian Literature Society and the British and Foreign Bible Society were closed.

On July 29, 1945, less than a month before the end of the war, all Protestant churches under Japanese control were ordered to abolish their denominational distinctions and combine into the Nihon Kirisuto-kyo Chosen Kyodan, the

Korean-Japanese Christian Church. During an organizational meeting for this purpose, a Shinto priest even led the Christian pastors to the Han River for a purification ceremony. Following this forced union about three thousand Christian leaders were arrested, and fifty of them suffered martyrdom. It was also reported that the Japanese army was planning to massacre a great many more Korean Christians in the middle of August 1945 because of the fear that these Christians might aid the Allied Forces in an invasion of Korea. Dr. Helen Kim wrote:

Some weeks after the atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we were told that over ten thousand leaders in Korean society who had been kept on the blacklist of the Japanese police were to have been arrested. In case of eventual Japanese defeat, the authorities thought these Koreans would become leaders and would retaliate against them. They had planned to massacre this group about the fifteenth of August, which proved to be the very day of the Japanese surrender.⁴²

On that memorable day of August 15, 1945, the turbulent relationships between Korean churches and Japanese state ended!

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29. The following figures show the growth of shrines within ten years from 1923 to 1933. These figures are based on Chosen Sotoku-fu Tokei Yorán, 1925, 195, and Tokei Nenpo, 1934, 294

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Jinja</u>	<u>Number of Jinshi</u>
1923	40	77
1924	41	103
1925	42	108
1926	43	107
1927	43	129
1928	47	152
1929	49	177
1930	49	182
1931	51	186
1932	51	199
1933	51	215

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
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Church and State Relations: Japanese Colonial Period

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In 1910, when Japan annexed Korea, the Roman Catholic Church had over one hundred years of history of its work in Korea with 46 expatriate missionaries, 15 native priests, 41 Korean seminaries, together with 69 churches and 73,517 members.¹ The Protestant Churches had three decades of works among the Koreans already, with rapidly increasing influences of the Presbyterians and the Methodists, with a Presbyterian membership of 12,202 and 3,621 Methodist members.²

The initial church and state relationship seemed surprisingly friendly. One missionary praised the encroachment of the Japanese in such kind words:

Prior to the annexation the administrative system was chaotic. By stern enforcement the Japanese have introduced quiet and order, have commenced to exploit the natural resources of the country, set up a judiciary, developed the beginning of an educational system, improved communication, and cultivated hygiene.³

Such acceptance of Japanese rule by the missionaries was further reflected in a letter from Rev. Arthur J. Brown, Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, to a Japanese government official, Hanihara Masanao: "Japanese

administration is far better than Korea would otherwise have had and far better than Korea had under its own rule."⁴

Acceptance of the Japanese administration was not merely a friendly gesture on the part of the missionaries; it was also the official policy of the Presbyterian mission, the largest mission in Korea. Their mission board secretary Arthur Brown further wrote:

What is the attitude of the missionaries toward the Japanese? There are four possible attitudes: First, opposition; second, aloofness; third, cooperation; fourth, loyal recognition. . . the fourth, loyal recognition, is I believe, the sound position. It is in accord with the example of Christ, who loyally submitted himself and advised His apostles to submit themselves to a far worse government than the Japanese, and it is in line with the teaching of Paul in Romans xiii:...⁵

The missionaries advised Korean Christians not to be involved in opposition to the Japanese, and Korean Christians also officially adopted the position of "loyal recognition" toward the Japanese colonial state.

Consequently, any Korean Christians who were involved in political movement against the Japanese were "kept from responsible positions in the Church."⁶

Yet, the Japanese government did not trust Christian churches. Sermons preached by missionaries or Korean pastors that were deemed suspicious were thus reported to the authorities. Suspicion of Korean Christians was especially strong in the winter of 1910-11 during the revival movement called "campaign for a million souls."

This great evangelistic effort by Protestant churches in Korea aimed to bring one million new Koreans into the Christian faith. Many revival meetings were held and fiery sermons were preached. These meetings, too, were carefully watched by Japanese government officials.

Inevitably such suspicion brought oppression and hostility toward the churches. The culmination of this was the fabrication of the so-called "Conspiracy Case." In October of 1911, the Japanese colonial government began to arrest Korea Christian leaders from the cities where Christian populations were significant in number. A missionary stationed in Sonchon reported:

Time after time arrests have been made, sometimes one or two and sometimes several at a time, until now there are fifty or more from our neighborhood. The parents and relatives of these men do not know why they were taken. The men themselves do not know why.⁷

Finally, the colonial government issued a statement accusing these Korean Christians of plotting to assassinate Governor-General Terauchi as he passed through Sonchon in late December of 1910. The government explained the conspiracy case in the following words:

In the course of the prosecution of a robber arrested in Sensen [Sonchon in Korean pronunciation], North Heian Province, in August, 1911, the fact that a gang of conspirators under the guidance of a certain ring-leader had been trying to assassinate Count Terauchi, Governor-General of Chosen, was discovered.⁸

Since the attempted assassination was to have taken place in

Sonchon, arrests of Christians in this town were so numerous that the Hugh O'Neill Jr. Industrial Academy, the largest Presbyterian mission school in the area, had to close.

Those accused were imprisoned without a public hearing until June 28, 1912, when finally 123 of them were indicted and brought to trial before the District Court of Seoul. All of the accused complained about being tortured at the police station. One of the accused declared, "I was told by one of the officials that one man had been killed as a result of torture, and I was threatened that if I did not stick to the statements I had made, I should meet the same fate."⁹ A veteran missionary who was in Korea during the trial later wrote in demonstration of the falsity of such confessions:

I was able to secure a copy of the so-called confession before the police of the elder in whom I was especially interested. To my surprise and consternation I found that he had apparently not only confessed to the police that he had conspired with others to kill the governor-general when he came to Pyongyang, but that several missionaries including myself had attended one of their meetings and had urged the Koreans to be brave and kill the governor-general without fail. However, the record showed that the elder in his subsequent examination before the procurator had indignantly denied having had any part in or even knowledge of the alleged conspiracy.¹⁰

On September 28, after three months, the trial came to an end, 105 men were found guilty. However, the court could not truly establish the guilt of those accused. Indeed, the case was full of holes from the start. On the dates which

the prosecution charged that Yun Chi Ho had met the other plotters in Seoul, he was in Kaesong City. Also, the confessions stated that toward the end of December 1910, conspirators travelled to Sonchon to kill General Terauchi. The investigation showed, however, that during the last six days of December the number of passengers arriving in Sonchon by two different railways did not exceed seventy. Finally, in a curious twist, the court did not try any missionaries. If they had been involved in the meetings, handing out revolvers and urging "the Koreans to be brave and kill the governor-general without fail," then they should have been charged as well. However, as missionaries were not called to account, neither were they allowed "to be called as witnesses for the defense."¹¹ For all these reasons, the entire trial was a complete fabrication.

The Korean Christians now convicted of "attempting to assassinate the governor-general" appealed to the Seoul Appeals Court and the court met fifty-one times between November 26, 1912, and February 25, 1913. The court reduced the ten years sentences to six years of penal servitude, and some were acquitted. However, the accused refused to accept the decision of the appeals court and went to the Higher Court of the Governor-General. That court chose to reconsider only the cases of those sentenced to penal servitude, and the rehearing began on July 1, 1913, in Taegu appeals court. It ended three days later, and the decision

was announced on July 15. The Court upheld the previous court's decision with minor changes in terms of sentences. Again the defendants brought the case before the Higher Court, but on October 9, 1913, the court ruled against any further hearing and upheld the judgment of the Taegu court.

There was no question that those prosecuting the "Conspiracy Case" had no case whatsoever. The government was unable to produce even the slightest evidence of the conspiracy on the part of Christians in Korea or abroad. This "conspiracy case" only escalated the tension between the church and state relations.

The church leaders in the United States concerned for the Christian cause in Korea interpreted the Conspiracy Case as evidence of Japan's political aim to suppress Christianity. Dr. Brown, the secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Mission, made a strong protest against the case and against Japanese government:

. . . we cannot be indifferent to the effect of the present policy of the Japanese police upon a mission work which now represents approximately 330 foreign missionaries, 962 schools, a medical college, a nurses' training school, thirteen hospitals, eighteen dispensaries, an orphanage, a school for the blind, a leper asylum, a printing press, 500 churches, a Christian community of 250,000, property worth approximately a million dollars, and an annual expenditure of over \$250,000. This extensive work is being injuriously affected by the reign of terror which now prevails among the Koreans.¹²

The Japanese government was surprised and disturbed to hear such reactions. On February 13, 1915, the colonial government released all of the accused before the completion

of their prison sentences. However, the government continued oppressive policies against the Christian churches in various ways.

In the area of medical works of the missionaries, for example, the government was fully aware of the shortage of doctors and the great assistance rendered by medical missionaries. The need for doctors was so great that the government permitted some Japanese to practice medicine without official licenses and proper qualifications. Despite the obvious need, the government persisted in restricting the medical practice of Christian missionaries by making it unusually difficult for them to obtain licenses. On November 15, 1913, Ordinance No. 100 was issued by the government requiring all who desired to practice medicine to apply for permission from the governor-general. The ordinance listed as qualifications:

1. Those qualified according to the law in force in Japan
2. Those graduated from medical schools recognized by the Governor-General
3. Those who have passed a medical examination prescribed by the Governor-General
4. Those Japanese subjects graduated from medical schools of good standing in foreign countries
5. Those foreigners who have obtained a license in their respective countries, in which qualified Japanese subjects are permitted to practice medicine.¹³

Without considering the difficulties of obtaining licenses under the requirements laid down in items one through four,

item five alone limited foreign medical practice in Korea to those of British nationality. Only Great Britain permitted Japanese subjects who had received medical training and certification in Japan to practice medicine in Britain. The ordinance was modified in July 1914 to allow more foreign doctors to obtain general licenses, but restrictions against the Christian missionaries were not altogether eliminated.

In the area of Christian education there was also significant government pressure. General Ordinance No. 24, as contained in the "Revision of Regulations for Private Schools" issued in March 1915, excluded the Bible from all school curricula and required all teachers to learn the Japanese language within the next five years and teach only in that "national language."

On August 16 of the same year, in order to supervise the propagation of Christianity, Government Ordinance No. 83 stated that official permission had to be secured before opening a new church or employing any paid workers in a church. Such permission was very difficult to obtain. Some churches were never able to secure permission to build and eventually had to disperse as a result. Regulations such as these tightened the control on all Christian activities.

For Korean Christians, it was unquestionably clear that the Japanese state toward the Christian churches were oppressive, and that the "religious liberty" guaranteed by the constitution of Japan was not being honored in Korea.

Eventually, Korean Christians responded to such oppressive alien state policies with open protest and by aligning themselves with other religious groups opposed to Japanese rule. The first public exhibition of this solidarity was the nationwide "March First Independence Movement" of 1919, which was first and foremost a direct reaction by the Korean public against the Japanese colonial state.

Korean Christians were active participants in this independence movement of 1919. The sixteen of the thirty-three signers of the declaration were Christian leaders, among them Rev. Kil Son Ju, the first ordained Korean Presbyterian minister. Many Christian churches became gathering places for demonstrators to hear the declaration of independence read.

The government placed primary blame on the Christians for instigating the protests and retaliated against them. Christian worship services were even more closely supervised by police and many churches were ordered to close. Practically every Christian pastor in Seoul was arrested and jailed. Soldiers stopped people in the street in order to discover and punish more Christians.

The number of Christians arrested became so great that many Christian schools had to be closed. In some localities the police arrested all church officers. By the end of June 1919, the following numbers had been arrested:

Presbyterian. 1,461

Methodist	465
Roman Catholic	57
Other	207 ¹⁴

Less than four months later the number of Presbyterians in jail had increased to 3,804, among them 134 pastors and elders. In the course of this persecution, forty-one Presbyterian leaders were shot and six others were beaten to death. Twelve Presbyterian churches were destroyed, and the homes of many missionaries were searched by the police, resulting in more property damage. Some of the missionaries were physically attacked by soldiers and severely beaten. Under these conditions, the work of the church was disastrously affected. One missionary reported:

With the launching of the Independence Movement in March, 1919, the work suddenly stopped. Everything was changed. Schools had to be closed, Bible classes could not be held, Bible Institutes could not finish, trips to the country had to be cancelled, visiting in homes by missionaries was found to be inadvisable, many of our churches found their pastors, elders, helpers, and other church officers carried off to prison; missionaries lost their secretaries, language teachers, or literary assistants; every way we tried to turn regular work seemed impossible. . . .¹⁵

Of all the repressive measures taken against Christians, surely the most tragic was the massacre in the village of Cheamni, near Suwon city. Horace H. Underwood, the noted Presbyterian missionary, reported the incident in detail. On April 16, 1919, he and some friends left Seoul to visit Suwon. Nearing the town, they saw a large cloud of smoke. While visiting in nearby homes, Underwood had the

following exchange with a local farmer:

Underwood: "What is that smoke?"
Farmer: "That is a village that has burned."
Underwood: "When was it burned?"
Farmer: "Yesterday."
Underwood: "How was it burned?"
Farmer: (glancing around fearfully) "By the soldiers."
Underwood: "Why? Did the people riot or shout for independence?"
Farmer: "No, but that is a Christian village."¹⁶

Proceeding then to Cheamni the group learned that on the previous day, Japanese soldiers had arrived in the village and ordered all male Christians into the church. When they had gathered, about thirty in all, the soldiers fired on them with rifles and killed the survivors with swords and bayonets. Afterwards the soldiers set fire to the church and left.

Such violently oppressive measures were quickly criticized and deplored by church leaders in Korea and abroad. The Rev. Herbert Welch, bishop of the Methodist Episcopal church in Korea, visited Tokyo on his way to the United States meeting with Prime Minister Hara Takashi on May 15, 1919. The prime minister in his diary, now an important document, described the meeting:

I asked him to express his frank opinion on the Korean incidents. Then he said he is going to the United States to raise funds of two million dollars for the work of the church in Korea. But he feels quite uncertain about the future of the church in Korea in consideration of the severeness of the military rule, lawless actions of the gendarmeries and police, the oppression of Christians in various places, and discriminating

treatment of Koreans by the Japanese and discrimination in education.¹⁷

The prime minister's diary also recounts that on the next day, May 16, an entire committee of Christian missionaries from Korea visited Tokyo to report the oppressive situation there to Japanese officials.

The atrocities perpetrated on Korean Christians by Japanese soldiers and police were reported as well in the United States and in Europe despite efforts by the Japanese authorities to conceal the facts through their control of the communication systems. Upon learning of this persecution in Korea, the Commission of Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America sent a cable on June 26, 1919, to Premier Hara deploring Japanese actions and demanding administrative reform. The cable read:

Agitation regarding Chosen abuses increasingly serious, endangering good will. Cannot withhold facts. Urgently important you publish... that abuses have ceased and reasonable administrative reforms proceeding.¹⁸

On July 10 the Commission received a cablegram from the prime minister stating,

I desire to assure you that the report of abuses committed by agents of the Japanese Government in Korea has been engaging my most serious attention. I am fully prepared to look squarely at actual facts. As I have declared on various occasions, the regime of administration inaugurated in Korea at the time of the annexation, nearly ten years ago, calls on us for substantial modification to meet the altered conditions of things.¹⁹

The desire for "substantial modification" seemed to have been sincere on the part of Prime Minister Hara. Already in early April he had seriously discussed with his cabinet the possibilities of recalling Governor-General Hasegawa, providing equal opportunity for both Japanese and Koreans in education, abolishing the gendarmerie system, and generally treating Koreans without prejudice. To Hara's mind, it was clear that reform was needed if the Japanese administration was to continue, and he frequently brought up the Korean question in Tokyo cabinet meetings. On June 27, 1919, the cabinet discussed replacing Hasegawa Yoshimichi with Navy Admiral Saito Makoto as Governor-General of Chosen. In his diary the prime minister wrote:

I visited Admiral Saito Makoto and consulted about his willingness to assume the position of Governor-General and he consented. In the evening I invited Mizuno Rentaro and asked him to become the Administrative Superintendent (the next highest post) in Chosen, and I received his consent.²⁰

On August 4, 1919, the cabinet finally agreed to replace the governor-general and introduce political reforms. The Japanese emperor officially appointed Admiral Saito as the new governor-general on August 12. Saito Makoto was born in 1858. He had spent some time in the United States as a student and also as naval attaché to the Japanese embassy in Washington.

A week after Saito's appointment to the Korean position, on August 19, 1919, the "Imperial Rescript

Concerning the Reorganization of the Government-General of Chosen" was made public. Among other things it stated:

We are persuaded that the state of development at which the general situation has now arrived calls for certain reforms in the administrative organization of the Government-General of Korea, and we issue our imperial command that such reforms be put into operation.²¹

The reforms brought about a change in policy toward the Christian churches. Admiral Saito had conferred with missionary leaders after his arrival in Seoul. He asked them to frankly express their opinions on the Japanese administration and to make suggestions. In response, the Federal Council of Protestant Evangelical Mission in Korea prepared a statement and submitted it in September 1919. After expressing gratitude for the planned reforms, the document went on to say:

It was a keen disappointment to us, who had lived in Korea under the former government to find that what we had expected from the Japanese administration after annexation, was not forthcoming, but that military rule to which the country was subjected, restricted the religious liberty and educational freedom which had been enjoyed, introduced unjust discrimination against the Koreans, and eventually imposed upon the people such subjection and such harsh measures of oppression, as to call forth from them to the protest of the independence agitation of this year. The unarmed demonstrations at that time were met with such brutality. . . and we were forced for the sake of humanity to give expression to our protests.²²

The missionaries also said, "We urge that religious liberty, which is already guaranteed by the constitution of

the Empire of Japan, ... be made effective," and then made the following important requests:

1. That fewer restrictions be placed upon the church and upon missionaries
2. That discrimination against Christians and against Christianity by officials not be allowed
3. That missionaries be allowed to include the teaching of the Bible and religious exercises in the curricula of church schools
4. That restrictions on the use of the Korean language be removed.
5. That we be accorded more liberty in the management of our schools and freedom from unnecessary official interference
6. That teachers and pupils be allowed liberty of conscience
7. That the details of the management of our hospitals be left to the staff without interference from officials
8. That the censorship of Christian books be abolished²³

Subsequent meetings between government officials and missionaries were frequent.

The new administration established a Section of Religious Affairs in the Department of Education to foster both the expression of public opinion and the convenience of religious propagators. Three Japanese Christians were appointed to its staff. The government also decided to recognize the property of financial foundations used for religious purposes as "juridical persons," a decision which provided a more convenient method for the management of mission properties.

Significant changes were also made in regard to Christian education. The former administration had fixed a

definite curriculum for all grades of Christian private schools that precluded additional courses on the Bible or religion. However, in March 1920, new regulations for private schools were issued. The only required subjects were on "morals" and the Japanese language. Religion was again allowed to be taught in Christian schools. Further modifications of the law in 1922 and 1923 permitted the Korean language to be taught and spoken in the schools.

Policies governing Christian work in general were also changed. Before reform, specific permission from the governor-general was a prerequisite for the opening of a new church or other religious institution. If this was violated, a severe fine was levied. In April 1920, new regulations came out abolishing the fines and requiring only that new church openings be reported to the government. The government still reserved the right to close buildings if the institutions were found to have been used as "places for concocting plots injurious to the public peace and order."²⁴

Church workers and government officials began to maintain close, friendly contacts, and Japanese officials often praised the Christian church's contribution to the betterment of Korean life. The following statement by Dr. Mizuno at the Tenth Annual Conference of the Federal Council of Protestant Evangelical Missions in Korea on September 21, 1921, expressed this new attitude:

. . . I have made several trips into the country, and the more familiar I become with the conditions

in the peninsula, the more do I realize how painstakingly you labor for the uplift of the people. . . It can be said without any appearance of flattery that Chosen owes much of her advancement in civilization to your labors. . . So we hold Christianity in high regard to give it every possible facility for its propagation.²⁵

The churches' membership had declined in 1919 (the year of the independence movement), but had begun to increase under the new administration as the following statistics show:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Christians</u>
1918	319,129
1919	296,487
1920	323,575
1921	355,114
1922	372,920 ²⁶

Taking advantage of new opportunities, Christians held many evangelistic campaigns and revival meetings.

Despite all these good signs, it would be overstating the case to conclude that Christians under the Saito administration enjoyed full religious liberty with no restrictions placed on Christian work. The Japanese maintained a distrust of Korean Christians, and spying on Christian church activities continued. One missionary wrote:

They (the policemen) often insist on attending the services of the churches and schools and in regulating what is said and done. They frequent the halls of the schools and arrest the students on all sorts of suspicion. They censor all publications and often object to articles in the weekly church's paper. . .²⁷

However, the greatest problem that Christians faced

during this period arose from the worldwide economic depression. Some eighty percent of the Korean population depended on the land for their livelihood, but because of Japanese expansion onto the Korean farms, many farmers who had tilled their lands for generations lost their property. A missionary recounted:

There are now immense Japanese holdings that once belonged to Koreans and hundreds of Japanese small farmers are taking the land and the place of a like or greater number of Koreans; for the man from Japan can farm more than a Korean can and always manage to get hold of the land.²⁸

Korean Christian farmers were especially vulnerable to this change of ownership. Japanese landowners who were antagonistic to Christians would often take away the land rights from their Christian tenants and give them to other Japanese or to non-Christian Korean farmers.

After Admiral Saito Makoto's second term ended in 1931, General Ugaki Kazunari was appointed Korea's new governor-general.

The Ugaki administration seemed to maintain the policies of the Saito administration, and so the "rule of culture" did not yet disappear. The prevailing attitudes even resulted in awards being presented in recognition of the positive contributions made by missionaries in Korea. Dr. O. R. Avison, a medical missionary and educator, received the fourth degree of the Order of the Sacred Treasure from the Emperor of Japan, and early in 1937 the

Imperial Educational Association presented Dr. Samuel Moffett with a gold medal.

In Tokyo, however, the militarists were expanding their influence and engaging in terrorist activities to suppress liberal democratic elements in Japanese politics. They attacked Western ideas of democracy and demanded chauvinistic devotion to the emperor from the people. With the establishment of Manchukuo, Korea gained new significance regarding the communication, economy, and defense of the Japanese empire. The devotion of the Korean people to the empire became, from the Japanese viewpoint, more important than ever before, and as a means of making Koreans more loyal subjects, the Japanese administration began urging all Koreans including Christians to participate in Shinto ceremonies, for which an increasing number of shrines were built throughout the country.²⁹

To Christians, Shinto religion became a serious issue after 1935, when the government ordered all educational institutions, including private Christian schools, to pay obeisance by attending the shrine ceremonies. In previous years when the government had asked Christian schools to participate, Christians had been able to excuse themselves by participating in some other forms of constructive activities.

On November 14, 1935, the governor of South Pyongan Province called a conference of educators. Before the

meeting he wanted all of them to visit Shinto shrines. Dr. George McCune, president of Union Christian College in Pyongyang, and Velma L. Snook, principal of Sungui Girls' High School, refused to do so. The governor ordered them to leave the meeting and gave them sixty days to reconsider their action. If the missionaries' attitude did not change in that time, he warned, their educational qualifications would be revoked. The missionaries held their ground even after sixty days, and in retaliation the government did indeed revoke their educational permits. Police guarded Dr. McCune's house, and followed him wherever he went. On January 20, 1936, McCune was relieved of his college presidency and Snook was relieved of her principalship. Yet all the while, in trying to bring Koreans to the Shinto ceremonies, the government tried to persuade them that the rites had nothing to do with religion, but were instead patriotic acts:

The veneration of her illustrious dead in places specially dedicated to their memory has been a national custom of Japan for ages past, and the state ceremonies for this purpose are treated by the Government as distinct from those of a purely religious nature.³⁰

On January 29, 1936, seven Christian leaders, including Yun Chi Ho and Ryang Chu Sam, General Superintendent of the Korea Methodist Church, visited the Department of Education of the Japanese colonial government to address this issue. Mr. Watanabe, the head of the department, emphasized that

attendance at the ceremonies was a civil, not a religious act, and that participation was simply a payment of the highest respect to one's ancestors.

Korean Christians who had abandoned their own ancient practice of ancestor worship as idolatry were not easily convinced that paying such respect to Japanese ancestral spirits was not worship. In spite of the efforts to persuade them, most Korean Christians rejected the government's definition and refused to participate in the ceremonies. Many believed that bowing to the shrines violated God's commandment against idolatry, and the overwhelming majority of expatriate missionaries also understood the shrine ceremonies as religious acts.

Roman Catholics especially, though they came to accept the government definition after 1936, took Shinto rites to be highly religious in nature. A Japanese bishop told his people in 1931:

The Shinto Shrines, so the high authorities of the government tell us, do not maintain a religion, but as a matter of fact the ceremonies that are performed therein have a full religious character. Thus the sacred right of religious freedom, given to the people in Article 28 of the Constitution, is forgotten and violated by the ministry of education.³¹

Roman Catholics in Korea before 1936 understood that participation in the shrine ceremonies was idolatrous. This was changed by specific instructions from Rome. The story is told by Rev. Edward Adams, a veteran Presbyterian

missionary in Korea, that in a meeting of educators called by the government, Dr. McCune was challenged for his opposition towards participation in Shinto ceremonies. A Roman Catholic missionary who happened to be seated next to McCune whispered to him, "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church."³² On May 25, 1936, the Sacred Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith instructed Catholics in the Japanese Empire, including Korea at that time, to accept the government order. Item One of this instruction said:

The Ordinaries in the territories of the Japanese Empire shall teach their faithful that the ceremonies, conducted by the government at Jinja are civil affairs. According to the repeated, explicit declaration of the authorities and the common consensus of the educated, shrine ceremonies are mere expressions of patriotic love, that is filial reverence toward the royal family and the benefactors of their own nation; and that, consequently, these ceremonies have only civil value and that Catholics are permitted to participate in them and behave like the rest of the citizens.³³

The instructions resolved the shrine issue as far as the Roman Catholics were concerned. However, for Protestants, especially Presbyterians, the problem remained serious to the point that one mission report stated, "At present, possibly no problem of missionary policy is more difficult than that occasioned by the requirement of the Japanese government of attendance at the national Shinto shrines."³⁴ Protestants continued to reject the government's insistence on the nonreligious nature of shrine

ceremonies. A typical explanation for their opposition can be seen in a statement by the mission of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria (Australia):

We wish to express the high respect and loyalty which we hold toward His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan; this we do in gratitude for the blessings of good government. . . But since we worship one God, alone, Creator and Ruler of the universe, revealed as the Father of Mankind, and because to comply with an order to make obeisance at shrines which are dedicated to other spirits, and at which acts of worship are commonly performed, would constitute for us a disobedience to His expressed commands, we therefore are unable ourselves to make such obeisance or to instruct our schools to do so.³⁵

The opposition of Presbyterian groups was so strong that the Executive Committee of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America soon felt compelled to recommend closure of the Korean mission schools:

Recognizing the increasing difficulties of maintaining our Mission schools and also of preserving in them the full purposes and ideals with which they were founded, we recommend that the Mission approve the policy of retiring from the field of secular education.³⁶

Some schools in Taegu and Seoul had difficulty closing at first because of Korean and missionary efforts to keep them open, but Pyongyang schools did not enroll any new students in 1937, and finally in March, 1938, all schools were closed, including the Union Christian College.

In August, 1936 a tough-minded militarist, General Minami Jirō, commanding officer of the Kwanto Army, became

the new governor-general of Korea. With militarists in control in Tokyo, General Minami was able to place Korea under a firm military dictatorship as well.

Meanwhile, government pressure on the Christian churches to participate in the Shinto ceremonies increased. It became more and more difficult to resist. In 1937, the Methodists, decided to comply with the government's request, agreeing with the government's claim that shrine attendance was a patriotic rather than a religious rite. In February 1938, the government called a conference of Christians intended to shape their thinking on the world situation at the time and to demand Christian support in the war efforts of the empire. The Presbyterians, at their general Assembly meeting of September 1938 in Pyongyang, finally agreed to obey the government order regarding shrine ceremonies.

However, it should be noted that the "surrender" of the Presbyterians was affected by an unusual use of government pressure. Before the meeting of the 400 delegates, each delegate was taken to a police station and simply told there by the police to approve shrine participation. Then, when the session began, high-ranking police officials sat right in front facing the delegates. No debates or negative votes were allowed, and anyone who tried to leave was brought back by police escort. With little other choice, the assembly resolved that participation in Shinto ceremonies was not a religious act and therefore did not conflict with the

teachings of Christianity. After the meeting the delegates did their obligatory obeisance at the shrine in Pyongyang.

The "official approval" of shrine attendance by the largest and most powerful Christian denomination in Korea proved an effective means of suppressing any further Christian resistance. The Shrine issue was solved as far as the government was concerned, but war policies of the government was to bring about more oppressive policies against Korean Christians.

In May 1939, the government called a meeting of Christian leaders in order to form an organic union of all Christian denominations under the Nihon Kirisuto Kyodan (the United Church of Christ in Japan), which would allow for more effective control of the Korean church bodies. The gathering of over seventeen hundred leaders, representing forty-seven Christian organizations, instituted an organization called the Chosen Kirusuto-Kyo Rengokai (the Federation of Korean Christian Churches).³⁷

Japanese pressures on Korean Christians to conform to Japanese war policies continued relentlessly. The government interference in church affairs increased, and any activities of which the government disapproved became excuses to imprison church leaders or expel missionaries. The "Day of Prayer Incident" in September 1941 was a typical example. Christian women throughout the world observed the World Day of Prayer during the last week of February.

Korean women had joined in this observance with their sisters around the world for many years. In preparation for the day, Reverend Herbert Blair, chairman of the Federal Council of Churches, asked Alice Butts of Pyongyang to make a short outline of the Day of Prayer program available to the churches. When the police examined the program, they discovered a prayer "for the Peace of the World" and charged that such a prayer was a sign of disloyalty to the war effort. Butts was imprisoned for one month, and many Christian leaders were brought to police stations for interrogation.

At this point, the Christian churches in Korea were completely controlled by the Japanese state. A paper prepared by missionaries on November 22, 1949, four years after the end of Japanese rule in Korea, documented that no church meeting could be held without police permission, nor without the presence of police representatives at every session. Restrictions imposed upon foreign missionaries were tight, including a restriction against their holding any administrative positions in the church. As Japan progressed toward war, the missionaries were compelled to withdraw from Korea. In October 1940, the United States' Consul-General, Gaylord Marsh, called representatives of the missions and informed them of the State Department's order to evacuate all Americans. Marsh urged an early evacuation and arranged to bring the S.S. Mariposa to the Inchon port

on November 16. On that day, 219 American citizens, practically all missionaries, were evacuated. Of the further withdrawal of missionaries up to March 31, 1941, the Japan Christian Year Book gave these figures:

Of the 108 reported in 1939 by the Methodist Mission, only 3 remain, and they will leave in April. Out of 66 Southern Presbyterians 5 remain. Of 14 Anglicans, 3 are here, all plan to leave this spring. The Northern Presbyterians, with 118 members in 1939, have 14 now.³⁸

With the main body of missionaries out of Korea, it seemed that the church simply became one more organization working for the Japanese cause. A statement adopted by the Executive of the Presbyterian Church at the General Assembly meeting in November 1940 proclaimed:

By following the guidance of the Government and adjusting to the national policy based on group organization, we will get rid of the wrong idea of depending on Europe and America, and do our best to readjust and purify Japanese Christianity. At the same time the church members, as loyal subjects of the Emperor, offering public service without selfishness, should go forward bravely to join in establishing the New Order in Asia.³⁹

This same outline added "Like other people, the church members should attend the shrine worship." On December 6, 1940, the Standing Committee of the Korean Presbyterian General Assembly called a meeting to form the Total National Force Union. The meeting was attended by some 220 delegates from each presbytery as well as by Vice-Governor-General Ohno and other officials of the Colonial government. The assembly passed a resolution that "Chosen Presbyterians are

resolved to give up the principle of reliance on Europe and America and reform our church as a purely Japanese Christianity.⁴⁰ The Methodists in Korea made a similar statement:

It is both urgent and proper that we Christians should bring to reality the true spirit of our national polity and the underlying principle of Naisen Ittai (Japan Proper and Korea form One body), perform adequately our duties as a people behind the gun, and conform to the new order, therefore we, the General Board of the Korean Methodist Church, hereby take the lead in deciding upon and putting into effect the following:

- I. Right Guidance of Thought
- II. Educational Reform
- III. Social Education
- IV. Support of the Army
- V. Unified Control of Organizations⁴¹

After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the Japanese imperial forces entered into direct confrontation with the United States. As the war progressed, the government attempted to force confessions of anti-Japanese activities in christian churches. The remaining missionaries in Korea, including sixty-seven Roman Catholics, were imprisoned. During the war, many churches were without pastors, and Christians were forced to work on Sundays. Institutions such as the Christian Literature Society and the British and Foreign Bible Society were closed.

On July 29, 1945, less than a month before the end of the war, all Protestant churches under Japanese control were ordered to abolish their denominational distinctions and combine into the Nihon Kirisuto-kyo Chosen Kyodan, the

Korean-Japanese Christian Church. During an organizational meeting for this purpose, a Shinto priest even led the Christian pastors to the Han River for a purification ceremony. Following this forced union about three thousand Christian leaders were arrested, and fifty of them suffered martyrdom. It was also reported that the Japanese army was planning to massacre a great many more Korean Christians in the middle of August 1945 because of the fear that these Christians might aid the Allied Forces in an invasion of Korea. Dr. Helen Kim wrote:

Some weeks after the atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we were told that over ten thousand leaders in Korean society who had been kept on the blacklist of the Japanese police were to have been arrested. In case of eventual Japanese defeat, the authorities' thought these Koreans would become leaders and would retaliate against them. They had planned to massacre this group about the fifteenth of August, which proved to be the very day of the Japanese surrender.⁴²

On that memorable day of August 15, 1945, the turbulent relationships between Korean churches and Japanese state ended!

ENDNOTES

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28. L.T. Newland, "Is the Church Meeting Korea's Economic Problems?" The Korean Mission field, XXV, No. 4 (April 1929), 69.

29. The following figures show the growth of shrines within ten years from 1923 to 1933. These figures are based on Chosen Sotoku-fu Tokei Yoran, 1925, 195, and Tokei Nenpo, 1934, 294

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Jinja</u>	<u>Number of Jinshi</u>
1923	40	77
1924	41	103
1925	42	108
1926	43	107
1927	43	129
1928	47	152
1929	49	177
1930	49	182
1931	51	186
1932	51	199
1933	51	215

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36. Minutes and Reports of the Chosen Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1936, 37.

37. Sanjunen-shi, 856. This account is based on an official Japanese government source. However, it is questionable whether a large number of Christian leaders actually attended the meeting to form such a federation. Korean and English Christian sources are silent on this matter.

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